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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (6 Feb 70) FOR OT UT 694306

10 February 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 11th
Armored Cavalry Regiment, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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Kenneth G. Wickham

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
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AVIC-WE

22 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

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SECTION I - OPERATIONS

1. (C) INTRODUCTION: This Operational Report - Lessons Learned covers the period 1 August through 31 October 1969. During this period the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment continued Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR under the operational control (OPCON) of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). A summary of all OPCON changes is found in Annex C.

Regimental operations during this period were centered in BINH LONG Province, particularly the populated areas near LOC NINH, QUAN LOI, and LONG KHANH Province.

Following the enemy offensives in mid-August and early September (described below), main force NVA/VC units once again left the Regiment's area of operations (AO) and a new lull, similar to that of July, commenced. In August the Regiment executed spoiling attacks and counterattacked in response to a new enemy offensive. In mid-September the Blackhorse Regiment assumed a protective reaction posture vis-a-vis the populated areas of BINH LONG Province and emphasized the performance of ground reconnaissance, night ambushes, and seal and search operations aimed at the destruction of VC local forces and the Viet Cong infrastructure. These operations are all part of an extensive program to enhance hamlet security and upgrade ARVN and RF/PF forces in BINH LONG Province.

Several significant events occurred during the reporting period, each of them illustrating the Regiment's flexibility and combat power: a. The Battle of Northern BINH LONG Province, 8-20 August; b. The initiation of a Regimental DONG TIEN (Go Forward Together) Program, 11 October; c. The airlift of one armored cavalry troop (A/1/11 ACR) to BU DOP to reinforce the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), 18 August; d. The Vietnamization of Blackhorse Base Camp, 24 October; and, e. The conversion of the armored cavalry platoons of 2nd and 3rd Squadrons to the AR/IAV, M551. Each is discussed in further detail below.

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Upon the return of the 1st Squadron to Regimental control just prior to the reporting period, the 3rd Squadron moved to Blackhorse Base Camp for conversion to the AR/AAV, M551 Sheridan. While there, the Squadron, which was OPCON to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade, performed limited operations in the area and executed a training program for the 5th Cavalry Regiment (ARVN). On 6 September, the 3rd Squadron completed this program and returned to Regimental control, thereby releasing the 2nd Squadron for conversion to the Sheridan. This conversion was performed at DI AN where the Squadron was under OPCON of 1st Infantry Division. With the return of the 2nd Squadron on 10 October, the Regiment was once again operating with all three squadrons under its operational control.

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY:

a. General: During the reporting period the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment conducted its operations in western Military Region 10.

b. Intelligence Activities: On 1 August, enemy forces in III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (III CTZ) initiated the Summer-Autumn Campaign. This offensive was directed against Allied military installations with some localized harassment of Vietnamese villages and hamlets. The AN LOC and LOC NINH areas were the focal points of enemy activity in the III CTZ during this reporting period.

Enemy initiated activity in western Military Region 10 during late July and the first half of August can be divided into three distinct phases: 24 July - 6 August, 6-11 August, and 12-16 August. The first phase was characterized by sporadic mortar/rocket attacks, scattered small-scale ground probes, isolated mining incidents, and increased reconnaissance activity.

During the first phase three ralliers revealed the enemy's intentions in BINH LONG province. On 29 July, Nguyen Van An, platoon leader of the H21 Sapper/Reconnaissance Company, 272nd VC Regiment, rallied to the 214th RF Company at BINH NINH (XT721858), 3 kilometers southwest of AN LOC. On 3 August, An stated that the 271st and 272nd VC Regiments, along with the D368 Local Force Battalion, would attack AN LOC, while elements of the 7th NVA Division attacked QUAN LOI, LOC NINH, and BO DUC. According to An, the attacks would be initiated between 5 and 15 August 1969.

On 2 August, Nguyen Van Sen rallied to the 399th RF Company at TAN HUNG (XT853876), 8 kilometers east of AN LOC. Sen, a member of the Propaganda Section of the HUNG PHAT-HUNG YEN Local Force, stated that on 15 July two companies from the 9th VC Division visited his camp and reconnoitered the surrounding area. The day before he rallied, Sen reported that 40-50 men from the D368 Local Force Battalion passed through his base camp asking for directions to SOC TRANH (XT843822).

On 3 August, Nguyen Van Thien rallied to the 11th PF Platoon at Xu716050, 4 1/2 kilometers south of LOC NINH. Thien, a member of the G21 Sapper/Reconnaissance Company, had been wounded on 27 July in a contact with F/2/11 ACR but had managed to avoid capture. Thien reported that the K7 and K8 Battalions of the 209th NVA Regiment would attack SOC 10 (Xu716102) and a road

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junction along QL 13 between AN LOC and LOC NINH on or about 7 August.

The second phase began on 6 August and was characterized by the movement of enemy troops from secure base areas in or near Cambodia to forward positions throughout BINH LONG Province. During this phase there were several significant engagements involving members of the 271st and 272nd VC Regiments, the 101D NVA Regiment, and the 58th Artillery Battalion.

The third phase (attack phase) began during the night of 11-12 August and was characterized by light attacks by fire followed by moderate to heavy ground probes, primarily in the AN LOC area. During the early morning hours QUAN LOI (XT615905), 6 kilometers southeast of AN LOC, was attacked by the K4 Sapper Battalion, 16th Armor Office, COSVN, and the K3 Battalion of the 271st VC Regiment. The headquarters of the 15th Cavalry Regiment (ARVN) and elements of the 9th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) at FSB SIDEWINDER (XT739821), 1 1/2 kilometers south of AN LOC, received a heavy ground probe from the K3 Battalion, 271st VC Regiment. The K2 Battalion of the 271st VC Regiment attacked FSB ASPEN (XT747801), 8 kilometers south of AN LOC. Also, during the night of 11-12 August, E and H/2/11 ACR engaged elements of the 271st VC Regiment at XT712824, near MINH DUC.

On 12 August, two significant contacts along QL 13 were initiated by elements of the 101D NVA Regiment. On 13 August, attention shifted to the LOC NINH area where several engagements identified the K8 Battalion of the 209th NVA Regiment and elements of the 141st NVA Regiment.

Several significant engagements during the remainder of August identified members of the K4 Battalion, 165th NVA Regiment at XU776145; the C21 Sapper/Reconnaissance Company, 272nd VC Regiment at XT674905; members of the 101D NVA Regiment at XT765729; and the 228 Sapper/Reconnaissance Battalion at XT684938.

Friendly reconnaissance operations in western Military Region 10 during the first half of September produced only light and scattered contacts. The most active enemy units in the area were: the K7 Battalion, 16th Armor Office, COSVN, which conducted mortar attacks and ground probes against the 9th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) CP at CHON THANH (XT770619) and FSB THUNDER III (XT772656); the K9 Battalion of the 273rd VC Regiment, which ambushed one platoon of A/1-16 Infantry (MECH) at XT732883; and the K7, K8, and K9 Battalions of the 101D NVA Regiment which suffered heavy losses in several contacts.

On 7 September, Tran Tho Hung, who identified his unit as the K7 Battalion of the 101D NVA Regiment, rallied to the 214th RF Company Compound at BINH NINH (XT720862). Hung stated that the 101D NVA Regiment, reinforced by one battalion from the 9th VC Division, had the mission of ambushing the road that traverses the rubber between MINH DUC (XT720820) and QL 13 (XT763803). Acting on this information, I and M/3/11 ACR were deployed to the area and made contact with an unknown size enemy force at XT708820, 1 kilometer west

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of MINH DUC, and again at XT710840, 2½ kilometers northwest of MINH DUC. 1/3/11 ACR reinforced and the engagements cost the enemy 55 killed. The following day, a search of the area revealed a base camp at XT713836 consisting of 25 bunkers and an additional 28 NVA bodies. No unit identification was obtained.

During the last half of September, enemy units withdrew to positions in or near Cambodia. Only eight significant engagements were reported from mid-September through the end of October. Other enemy activity consisted primarily of logistical operations, ground to air firings, and mining incidents.

Enemy initiated activity throughout the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment's AO was restricted due to the extensive casualties suffered during the August highpoint. The absence of adequate logistical support, coupled with the destruction of numerous supply caches diminished the enemy's offensive potential and contributed to the further weakening of morale. At the present time, enemy units have withdrawn to positions in or near Cambodia.

c. Intelligence Sources: In the course of the quarter's operations, the Regiment employed the following intelligence sources: human sources, captured enemy documents, visual reconnaissance, and technical detectors.

(1) Human Sources: Human sources consist of prisoners of war, ralliers, and agents. Prisoners and ralliers were used most frequently, often on a daily basis. Information concerning enemy unit locations, capabilities, and probable courses of action was derived from extensive interrogation of these individuals by highly trained intelligence personnel. If the information proved reliable and of immediate tactical significance, the rallier was returned to the field where he was used to locate enemy positions and caches. As in the past, information provided by prisoners and ralliers was exchanged between the 11th ACR and other US and ARVN units adjacent to our area of operations. Agent reports, even though they were provided on a daily basis, proved unreliable and were of little value in the Regiment's intelligence collection effort.

(2) Captured Enemy Documents: Captured enemy documents were of primary value in establishing enemy unit identification. These documents were also useful in compiling blacklists and gaining information relating to enemy morale and intentions.

(3) Visual Reconnaissance: Visual reconnaissance missions were flown daily by the Air Cavalry Troop and provided the Regiment with the bulk of the immediate tactical intelligence. Trail activity, base camps, bunker complexes, and fighting positions were the most common sightings. Visual reconnaissance provided the targeting and planning data for B-52 strikes, armored reconnaissance operations, Aero Rifle Platoon (ARP) insertions, artillery missions, and TAC Air strikes.

(4) Technical Detectors: Technical detectors used included

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SLAR, Red Haze, Personnel Detector (Sniffer), ground sensors, and ground radar. SLAR, Sniffer and Red Haze have been of little use in Regimental operations. Ground sensors were used in a limited fashion during the quarter, and an assessment of their value is not possible. However, ground radar has proven useful in a perimeter defense role.

d. Enemy Losses: The following enemy losses have been credited to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment during the reporting period:

VC/NVA KIA (BC)	1059
VC/NVA PW's	20
Hoi Chanh	4
Individual weapons captured/destroyed	135
Crew served weapons captured/destroyed	66
Mines, captured or detected and evacuated or destroyed	93
Fortifications	328
Documents (batches)	19
Grain captured/destroyed (tons)	1½

3. (C) COMBAT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Analysis and Evaluation of Operations:

(1) Significant Contacts:

(a) Battle of Northern BINH LONG Province: The most significant aspect of combat operations during the period was the Battle of Northern BINH LONG Province. The battle followed the end of an enemy lull that extended through the entire month of July. The battle's significance is not limited to the grievous harm which it dealt to the 7th and 9th VC Divisions. It dramatically demonstrated the Regiment's ability to control a large number of combat elements. (At one time the Regiment had operational control of five maneuver battalions and coordinated the operations of five more ARVN infantry and cavalry battalions operating in the Regimental AO.) The battle also illustrated the flexibility of the Regiment as it accepted OPCON of new units, repositioned its forces, formed new task forces, and established joint command posts with the battalions of the 9th Infantry Regiment (ARVN)-- accomplishing all this within a period of five days while being threatened by a large-scale enemy attack.

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As described above, the enemy's plan of attack was obtained from a Hoi Chanh in early August. In general the plan was to employ the 271st and 272nd VC Regiments and the D368th Local Force Battalion against the AN LOC area. The enemy units would move to the edge of the rubber west of AN LOC and, under the cover of darkness, launch their attack. Elements of the 7th NVA Division were to conduct coordinated attacks against QUAN LOI, LOC NINH, and BO LUC. All intelligence indicated that the coordinated attacks would be executed between 5 and 15 August.

Acting on this intelligence, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment established joint command posts with the battalions of the 9th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) and repositioned forces to secure the populated areas of AN LOC and LOC NINH. In anticipation of the attack, the 11th ACR AO was reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry (MECH), additional battalions under the OPCON of the 9th Infantry Regiment (ARVN), and the 15th Cavalry Regiment (ARVN). On 8 August, the 1st Squadron, 11th ACR, the 34th Ranger Battalion (ARVN), and B Troop of the 1-9th Air Cavalry were organized under TF WRIGHT. TF WRIGHT was responsible for the northern AO and secured the district capital of LOC NINH. In the south, CHON THANH District was secured by a combined arms force under the 2nd Squadron (troop), 1st Cavalry Regiment (ARVN). With this increased force the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the two ARVN regiments initiated aggressive reconnaissance operations to seek out and destroy the NVA/VC forces threatening BINH LONG Province, and especially its capital, AN LOC.

On 10 August, counterattack plan ALPHA was formulated. The plan was designed to cut off NVA/VC forces attempting to withdraw following their attacks on AN LOC and LOC NINH. Possible routes and blocking positions were designated to be used in coordination with ARVN forces in the event of an attack.

The period 6-11 August was characterized by the movement of enemy troops from secure base areas in or near Cambodia to forward positions throughout BINH LONG Province. On 6 August at XU570216, approximately 18 kilometers north of LOC NINH, a LOC NINH sub-sector forward air controller (FAC) sighted 15-25 NVA in the open. The Air Cavalry Troop, 11th ACR, was called on station and killed 13 NVA in the air/ground battle. On 8, 9, and 10 August, the Air Cavalry Troop began to detect heavy enemy movement into the western portion of the AO. In each case, the enemy was engaged with rockets and minigun fire from attacking Cobras while field artillery and TAC Air supported, resulting in over 70 NVA/VC killed. On 9 August, in a unique and heroic action, the ARP captured 6 NVA who had been dazed by a B-52 strike. On 10 August, at XT637972, 12 kilometers to the northwest of AN LOC, the Air Cavalry Troop sighted an estimated company size enemy force in a lightly wooded area. The ARP was inserted and later reinforced by C/1-16 Inf, one company 4/9 Inf (ARVN) and the "Blues" of B/1-9 Air Cav. The contact resulted in 32 NVA killed, 4 PW's, and 4 Hoi Chanh from the 272nd VC Regiment and 58th Artillery Battalion.

The period 11-16 August was characterized by the execution of the enemy attack.

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Light attacks by fire were followed by moderate to heavy ground probes, primarily in the AN LOC area. At 0109 hours on 12 August, QUAN LOI received an undetermined number of 60mm mortar and B-40 rounds, followed by heavy ground probes from the south and west. The contact continued until 0430 hours. The Blackhorse was credited with 50 NVA killed, 7 NVA PW's, and 1 Hoi Chanh. Elements of the K4 Sapper Battalion and the K3 Battalion of the 271st VC Regiment were identified. US losses were 7 killed and 45 wounded.

The headquarters of the 15th Cavalry Regiment (ARVN) and elements of the 9th Infantry Regiment (ARVN) at FSB SIDEWINDER (XT739821), 4 1/2 kilometers south of AN LOC, received an unknown number of mortar and B-40 rounds followed by a heavy ground probe that breached the defenses at 0145 hours on 12 August. E/2/11 ACR was alerted and reinforced the besieged SIDEWINDER from FSB ASPEN (XT747801), 8 kilometers south of AN LOC. The ensuing battle cost the enemy 78 killed, 3 PW's and 4 Hoi Chanh. The attacking unit was identified as the K3 Battalion of the 271st VC Regiment. At 0145 on 12 August, FSB ASPEN received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar. Approximately forty minutes after the mortars had impacted, an estimated VC battalion initiated a heavy ground probe. The attacking unit, that was later identified as the K2 Battalion of the 271st VC Regiment, lost 32 soldiers killed and 1 captured.

In the northern half of the AO, enemy forces initiated two significant attacks in the vicinity of LOC NINH. At 0130 hours on 12 August, D/1/11 ACR, which was on an ambush patrol outside the village of LOC THIEN (XU728075), received small arms and RPG fire from an unknown size enemy force. Although the encounter was brief, D/1/11 ACR killed 19 NVA. At 0205 hours, elements of the 1st Squadron, also near LOC THIEN, received 15 rounds of mixed ordnance followed by a light ground probe. A short time later the enemy withdrew leaving 12 NVA killed.

On 12 August, the 11th ACR initiated a major counterattack. Initially E Troop and H Company, 2/11 ACR, were alerted to reinforce elements of the 15th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ARVN) in contact near MINH DUC. While enroute to aid the ARVN unit, an estimated battalion-size enemy force was engaged at XT7128824. Once again the "pile on" technique was utilized resulting in 85 NVA killed. On the same day at XT706903, 1 1/2 kilometers north of AN LOC, 1/1-16 Inf (OPCO) to the 11th ACR engaged an unknown size enemy force while moving to its assigned blocking position. C/1/11 ACR reinforced the contact which cost the enemy 28 killed. Although no unit identification was obtained, elements of the 272nd VC Regiment were believed to be involved.

Two significant attacks were triggered along QL 13 on 12 August. While escorting a convoy, F/2/11 ACR was engaged by an unknown size enemy force at XT766757, approximately 13 kilometers south of AN LOC. Fifty NVA were killed when the 2nd Squadron reacted to this contact. About an hour later, C/2-2 Infantry (MECH), also escorting a convoy, came in contact with an unknown size force at XT768761. 11th ACR elements also participated in this battle in which 54 NVA were killed and 3 NVA captured. The enemy unit was identified as an element of the 101st NVA Regiment.

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On 13 August, the LOC NINH area became the site of three major engagements. At XU695082, 3½ kilometers west of LOC NINH, D/1/11 ACR established contact with elements of the K8 Battalion of the 209th NVA Regiment. A/1/11 ACR and 1/34 Rangers (ARVN) reinforced, once again employing the "pile on" technique and killing 77 NVA. On 14 August, B/1/11 ACR and 3/34th Rangers (ARVN), while aggressively conducting reconnaissance in the vicinity of LOC NINH, encountered an unknown size enemy force and killed 21 NVA. Meanwhile, D/1/11 ACR, operating with the 3/34th Rangers (ARVN), killed 42 NVA. Although positive identification could not be confirmed in either of these two engagements, it is believed that elements of the 141st NVA Regiment were involved.

In summary, when the attacks began on the night of 11-12 August, the Blackhorse Regiment utilized counterattack plan ALPHA and moved 2/11 ACR and 1-16 Infantry into pre-arranged blocking positions. While moving to these locations, Regimental forces encountered some of the heaviest enemy resistance of this reporting period.

On 13 August, TF CASEY (1st Cavalry Division (AM) forward command post at QUAN LOI) established an AO along the Cambodian border and inserted blocking forces in an attempt to trap enemy forces withdrawing into Cambodia. The blocking forces had very little contact and, except for the 1st Battalion of the 5th Cavalry, were later extracted. On 16 August, the 1-5 Cavalry became OPCON to the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to conduct a coordinated operation with the 1-16 Inf (MECH) and the 4/9 Inf Regt (ARVN). Area reconnaissance of a suspected battalion-size base camp in the vicinity of XT6496 was the mission of these forces.

(b) Aftermath of the Battle: Although renewed attacks by the NVA/VC were expected during the latter part of August, no significant engagement materialized until 5 September when the 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR, was preparing to depart for DI AN to become OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division and train with the new M551 Sheridans. The 3rd Squadron arrived in the BLACKHORSE AO on 6 September and assumed responsibility for the 2/11 ACR AO when 2/11 ACR left on 7 September. During this repositioning of squadrons, the contact in the 11th ACR AO developed.

On 5 September, a D/1/11 ACR night ambush position (NAP) just west of FSB KELLY (XU731087) received thirty 120mm mortar rounds from the northwest. Approximately one half hour later, the C/1/11 ACR NAP (XU800145) received twenty 60mm mortar rounds. At 0345 hours, the forces at FSB JON received thirty 82mm mortar rounds. At 1655 at XU721155, C Troop, 11th ACR, received RPG and small arms fire from an estimated platoon-size enemy force. In the battle that followed C Troop killed 12 NVA and captured 3 AK-47's, 1 RPG-7 launcher, and 1 RPG-2 launcher.

Also on 5 September, the 1st Battalion of the 16th Infantry (MECH), OPCON to 11th ACR, encountered some of its heaviest resistance since entering the BLACKHORSE AO. The S-2, 1-16 and 1 Plt/A/1-16, while investigating some villages to the west of AN LOC, which had received incoming on the previous night,

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were ambushed by a company-size NVA/VC force at XT 730886. When A/1-16 (-) and C/1-16 moved to reinforce, they too were ambushed approximately 100 meters east of the original contact area by a battalion-size enemy force. In the bloody battle that followed, 2 US soldiers were killed and 68 troopers wounded. Sixty-three NVA were killed.

On 6 September, B Troop established contact with an estimated company-size force at XU690090. C Troop and D Company, with two companies of CIDG were alerted and moved to reinforce. Meanwhile field artillery, Blue Max, and a Pink Team gave fire support to B Troop. The contact resulted in 11 US wounded, 32 NVA killed and 5 NVA captured. Approximately one hour later, C/1-11 re-established contact with a NVA/VC force at XU698090, resulting in 2 US killed, 19 US wounded, and 25 NVA killed.

On 7 September at XT708820, I/3-11 ACR came in contact with an unknown size enemy force. The action resulted in 1 US wounded and 32 NVA/VC killed. A sweep of the contact area on the following day disclosed an additional 13 NVA/VC bodies. Approximately one half hour later, a Cobra from the Air Cavalry Troop spotted 15 NVA at XU768171. The Cobra expended his rockets and minigun, killing all fifteen.

(c) Renewed Lull: During the remainder of the reporting period enemy activity was light. On 8 October, 2/11 ACR re-entered the Regimental AO and assumed responsibility for the northern AO and for security of the district capital of LOC NINH. 2/11 ACR established FSB MARGE (XU738062) as a command headquarters. The 1st Squadron closed out FSB's JON and KELLY and assumed responsibility for a new AO southeast of AN LOC. The 1/11 ACR established FSB GWYN (XT826844) on 11 October. The 3rd Squadron, which had altered its AO following the return of the 15th Cavalry Regiment (ARVN) on 5 October, was now located west of AN LOC. This marked the first time that the 11th ACR has had three squadrons available for operations in the AN LOC/LOC NINH area.

(2) Airlift of A/1-11 to BU DOP/BO DUC.

(a) The threat posed to the BU DOP/BO DUC area by the 7th NVA Division caused the Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) to order the reinforcement of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (AM), then assisting the RVNAF units defending the area. Hence, on 16 August the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was given the mission to move one reconnaissance troop by air to BO DUC Sub-sector, placing it OPCON to the 3rd Bde, 1st Cavalry Division (AM). This order initiated one of the most interesting and unique operations of the Regiment's three years in Vietnam.

(b) Problems Encountered:

1 Because the operation was scheduled for 18 August, the Regimental and Squadron staffs had less than 40 hours to become "experts" on the techniques and requirements for air movement of an armored

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cavalry troop. The staff, which had no previous experience with this form of movement, had to determine which vehicles and supplies could and should be taken, request the necessary aircraft, and supervise preparation for the move.

2 The 8th Engineer Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), had already completed upgrading of the BU DOP airstrip. However, uncertainty still remained regarding the ability of the airstrip to accommodate the fully loaded C-130's required to transport A Troop's vehicles (minus Sheridans).

3 Because the M113A1's were configured as ACAV's and had additional belly armor, the information on vehicular weights was extremely ambiguous. Further, it was impossible to learn the exact weights of each vehicles to be flown because of irregularities presented in the vehicular TM's and TB 55-46.

4 Due to the extra flooring and load bearing equipment on board, the size of the C-130 cargo compartment did not coincide with publications available at Regimental Headquarters. Hence, the need for Air Force Technical assistance during the planning stages can readily be seen. Unfortunately, though, this assistance was requested by the 11th ACR, it was not received until after the request for air movement had been submitted and the first plane arrived at LOC NINH.

5 The operation also included some unusual logistical problems in addition to the movement of the vehicles. To move the vehicles by air the basic load of ammunition had to be removed from each vehicle. This required the prepositioning of large quantities of ammunition in BU DOP before the arrival of the vehicles.

(c) The Lift: All the critical problems were finally solved and, when the 16th of August came, the two phase operation was smoothly and effectively handled through coordination with load master, control teams and combat service support units.

1 The first phase (16 August) called for airlift of command and control vehicles, logistical support vehicles, and some vehicles for local security of the airfield. All crews accompanied their vehicles.

2 During phase two (17 August) the remainder of the combat vehicles and crews were lifted.

(d) The aftermath: When the last of the 24 sorties finally lifted off from LOC NINH airstrip, one could have easily gotten the impression that the move had been under discussion for weeks and had followed extensive staff coordination and planning. However, such was not the case. Only an intense effort by the staff, the unit to be moved, and USAF made the move appear so routine.

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While 3/11 ACR remained OPCON to the 3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM), it conducted extensive reconnaissance operations as well as adding to the security of the BU DOP/BO DUC area. However, it met with little enemy activity and no significant contact. Thus, on 8 October, A Troop was released OPCON 3rd Bde after returning, once again via C-130, to the BLACKHORSE AO and LOC NINH. For the remainder of the reporting period A Troop conducted operations with 1/11 ACR at LOC NINH and south of QUAN LOI.

b. DONG TIEN (Go Forward Together) Program:

(1) Introduction: During the latter part of this reporting period the DONG TIEN Program was initiated as another step toward the Vietnamization of the war effort. The Blackhorse effort in support of the DONG TIEN Program is divided into two broad categories: civic action and security operations.

(a) Civic Action: Those activities such as MEDCAP's, DENTCAP's, ICAP's, civil or military construction projects, propaganda broadcasts and demonstrations, and formal military training.

(b) Security Operations: Those activities such as US/ARVN/RF/PF/CIDG combined military operations, seal and search operations, and US advice, assistance or support for ARVN/RF/PF/CIDG military operations.

(2) DONG TIEN in Northern BINH LONG Province: Although the program is still new, some of the results can already be seen. The close cooperation of US and South Vietnamese units helps to build respect and mutual understanding. The program gives the ARVN/RF/PF/CIDG a chance to gain a little more insight into the manner in which US forces operate, thus adding to their combat effectiveness. Further, this cooperation gives the US units a better chance to observe the strengths and weaknesses of South Vietnamese forces, enabling them to adjust their training and operations accordingly. Formal training has included the use of demolitions, mine sweeping, Track Crew Proficiency Course (TCPC), combat assault techniques, joint ICAP's with on the job training for ARVN medics, flame thrower training, and training for ARVN mechanics and technical specialists. Additionally, the 11th ACR has initiated an extensive program of combined operations (a summary of this training is given in sub-paragraph (4) below).

(3) DONG TIEN at Blackhorse Base Camp: While the 3rd Squadron, 11th ACR, was receiving and training with the M551 AR/AAV (Sheridan) at Blackhorse Base Camp, joint operations and training were conducted with the 5th Cavalry Regiment, 18th Infantry Division (ARVN). The 3/11 ACR mission was to evaluate the ability of the 5th ACR (ARVN) to perform assigned missions under combat operations.

During the period 17 August - 4 October, the 5th Cavalry received a three-phase training program. To enable the 5th Cavalry to keep a troop at Blackhorse Base Camp, the 3/11 ACR sent one troop to QUAN LOC for combined

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operations and to help fulfill the operational and security requirements of the 5th Cavalry. Phase one of the training covered crew and platoon training. This emphasized individual and crew proficiency training by the 3rd Squadron, and platoon-size operations with a US troop. Phase two stressed troop operations under the control of 3rd Squadron. Each troop of the 5th Cavalry was to conduct troop-size operations under 3/11 ACR control for one week. Phase three was to be a squadron evaluation exercise in which the 5th Cavalry would receive the equivalent of an ATT. This phase of the training program provided the basis for evaluating the operational readiness of the 5th Cavalry. Unfortunately, the tactical situation in BINH LONG Province forced the departure of the 3rd Squadron prior to the completion of phases two and three. However, each ARVN troop received individual, crew, and platoon training, and one troop received the troop training.

(4) Statistical Summary of DONG TEIN activities and combined operations: The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and OPCON units have conducted the following number of combined operations in which a US company/troop has worked with an ARVN/PF/PF/CIDG unit during a 24 hour period. Represented below are combined operations and training from 1 Aug - 31 Oct.

COMBINED OPERATIONS

	<u>1/11</u>	<u>2/11</u>	<u>3/11</u>	<u>OPCON UNITS</u>
ARVN	19	34	N/A	23
RF/PF	0	6	N/A	0
CIDG	20	0	N/A	0

NOTES:

1. During this reporting period 3/11 ACR conducted operations and training with 5th Cavalry, 18th Div, at Blackhorse Base Camp. These figures have not been included.

2. These figures include the following airmobile operations conducted with 11th ACR assistance: ARVN - 20, RF - 2.

SEPTEMBER

	<u>1/11</u>	<u>2/11</u>	<u>3/11</u>	<u>OPCON UNITS</u>
ARVN	42	0	1	0
RF/PF	1	0	8	2
CIDG	3	10	14	14

NOTE: Airmobile Operations with 11th ACR: RF/PF - 3, CIDG - 2.

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OCTOBER

	<u>1/11</u>	<u>2/11</u>	<u>3/11</u>
ARVN	32	0	11
RF/PF	14	19	26
CIDG	2	2	2

NOTE: Airmobile operations with 11th ACR: CIDG - 1, RF/PF - 6. 11th ACR also requested ships used by 9th Regiment and 15th Cavalry Regiment in their CA's, providing technical assistance as required.

a. Joint command posts: During the following periods units of the 11th ACR maintained joint battalion (Squadron) level command posts with an ARVN battalion:

<u>US UNIT</u>	<u>ARVN UNIT</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
1/11 ACR	34th RNGR BN	8 August-6 September
2/11 ACR	4/9 INF	5-8 August
	2/9 INF	15-23 August
	Composite B1,	
	9th INF	23 August-6 September
3/11 ACR	3/9 INF (-)	6-14 September
1-16 INF	4/9 INF	3-28 August
	9th Co, 3/9 INF	29 August - 14 September

NOTE: 1-16 INF (MECH) was OPCON to 11th ACR during the above period.

b. Training: Since the initiation of a formal DONG TIEN Program on 11 October 1969, the 11th ACR has conducted formal training as indicated in the table below. The joint ICAP's are particularly significant. They are part of a program of OJT for ARVN and Provincial medical personnel and represent the first time, at least since June, that ARVN units in BINH LONG Province have participated in this aspect of the GVN pacification program.

DONG TIEN TRAINING (company - days)

	<u>1/11</u>	<u>2/11</u>	<u>3/11</u>
ARVN	0	0	12
RF/PF	8	2	0
ICAP's (joint)	10	7	15

NOTE: Does not include the training program for the 5th Cavalry Regiment.

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c. Blackhorse Base Camp:

(1) Blackhorse Base Camp was turned over to the 18th Infantry Division (ARVN) on 24 October 1969. Blackhorse, which is the largest base camp to be turned over to the RVNAF, represents another major step in the Vietnamization of the war. The turn over was operationally significant in that for the first time in three years the Regiment was released from the responsibility to maintain and secure a large base camp. This security requirement had usually necessitated keeping one entire squadron at Blackhorse. In the next quarter the Regiment will be better able to perform its mission of II FFORCEV "fire brigade". (An after action report on the turnover of Blackhorse to ARVN will be included in the next ORLL.)

(2) During the reporting period the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (REAR) was moved to BIEN HOA Army Base along with the rear detachments of the 1st and 3rd Squadrons. 2nd Squadron rear was relocated at DI AN. This relocation considerably shortened the Regiment's lines of communications, and in the next quarter, should enable the Regiment to shift more of its forces to forward areas.

d. Training:

(1) Replacement training was accomplished throughout the quarter to prepare replacements for the role they must fill as Blackhorse troopers. Monthly attendance during the reporting period was as follows:

August	---	488
September	---	229
October	---	192

(2) Specialized Training:

(a) Jungle Survival School: Five individuals attended jungle school in the Philippines during this quarter---two from the Air Cavalry Troop, two from the Aviation Platoon, and the Regimental Flight Surgeon.

(b) Cobra IP School: One individual from the Air Cavalry Troop attended the Cobra Instructor Pilot course at VUNG TAU.

(c) LOH IP School: One individual from the Aviation Platoon attended the LOH Instructor Pilot School at VUNG TAU.

(d) Armament School: Four individuals from the Air Cavalry Troop attended armament classes at VUNG TAU.

(e) PLL School: During this quarter eight individuals (two from each squadron plus one from HHT and one from the 919th Engineer Company) attended PLL School at LONG BINH.

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(f) M548 Cargo Carrier: A one-day course was conducted on the M548 Cargo Carrier by the 1st Squadron. Ten individuals attended.

(g) Sniper School: Thirteen troopers completed the 1st Team Academy's two-week sniper course at BIEN HOA.

(h) Night Vision Devices: Ten individuals attended starlight scope training conducted by the Regimental Signal Officer.

(i) Artillery School: During the past quarter six Blackhorse officers were sent to attend a one-week fire direction center course. The course was given by the 54th GP at LONG BINH. Ten individuals also attended forward observer school at PHUOC VINH. The week course is given by Division Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

(j) Sanitation Training: The Regimental Surgeon initiated sanitation training during this quarter. The first class was conducted on 29 October at FSB GWIN. Although the location will vary, the classes will be continued on a weekly basis.

(k) Mine Detector School: Two individuals from the 919th Engineer Company attended a one-day course at REDCATCHER on the detection of non-metallic mines. The 919th Engineers also conducted mine detector training for each of the three squadrons. Twenty-four individuals took this one-day course.

(l) Radar Instruction: Fifteen individuals attended PPS-4 training during this quarter. The instruction was given by Regimental Signal personnel at QUAN LOI. The Regimental Signal Officer also gave a demonstration on the PSR-1 sensor/seismic detector to 25 Blackhorse troopers. 2nd Squadron held a two-day course at DI AN on the PPS-4, and ten individuals attended.

(m) RATT Operators Course: Two individuals from the Regimental Signal Section attended a five-day course on the operation of the AN/GRC-106 SSB radio. The course was given by the 1st Signal Brigade at LONG BINH.

(n) Demolition Training: 919 Engineer cadre received refresher training at the 919th Engineer Headquarters. The instructional teams then went to all troops of the 11th ACR to conduct demolition training.

4. (C) COMBAT SUPPORT:

a. Army Aviation:

(1) Organization and Employment:

(a) Aviation Platoon, HHT/11th ACR

1 Organization: The Aviation Platoon consists

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of a command and control section with two OH-6A and two UH-1H aircraft, and a transport section with six UH-1H aircraft.

2. Employment: The Aviation Platoon operates from a location near the Regimental Command Post and performs command and control, liaison, resupply, courier, and limited troop transport for the Regimental Headquarters and subordinate organic and OPCON units of the Regiment.

(b) Squadron Aviation Sections:

1 Organization: Each of the three squadrons has an organic aviation section consisting of two OH-6A and two UH-1H aircraft.

2 Employment: The aviation section operates from a location near the Squadron Command Post and performs command and control, liaison, observation and reconnaissance, limited troop transport, resupply, and emergency medical evacuation for the squadron.

(c) Air Cavalry Troop:

1 Organization: The Troop consists of a Troop Headquarters with two UH-1H aircraft, an Aero Scout Platoon with nine OH-6A aircraft, an Aero Rifle Platoon with eight UH-1H aircraft, and an Aero Weapons Platoon with nine AH-1G aircraft.

2 Employment: The Troop operates from a forward base area in or near the Regimental AO and performs combat operations in an assigned AO or near the Regimental AO in support of subordinate organic or OPCON units of the Regiment.

When operating in an assigned area of operations, the Troop uses the "pile on" concept. First the Aero Scouts perform visual reconnaissance. When a target is located and developed, the Aero Weapons Platoon and Aero Rifle Platoon elements are employed. A ready reaction force (RRF) is available for immediate commitment. Experience has shown that, during the dry season, a tank unit provides the most effective reaction force; whereas, during the rainy season infantry troops are most effective due to trafficability. During the "pile on", direction and control are transferred to Regimental level until necessary forces are built up to accomplish the mission.

When Air Cavalry Troop supports a squadron or OPCON unit, it is generally given a mission-type order. A mission-type order allows the Troop Commander flexibility in tailoring his unit to accomplish the mission. Missions involving the Air Cavalry Troop in the AO are closely coordinated between the S-2, S-3, and Troop Commander.

The Troop is the primary intelligence gathering element of the Regiment, employing aerial research reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, bomb damage assessments, sensor (Sniffer) missions, night observation devices, and firefly missions. Employment of the Troop is based on intelligence or enemy

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contact. It can be employed to fight and destroy enemy forces as well as to develop the situation or gather intelligence information.

(d) Other: During the reporting period, the Air Cavalry Troop turned in two UH-1C aircraft in Troop Headquarters drawing two UH-1H aircraft in their place. Also, the squadrons turned in their UH-1D aircraft, and drew new UH-1H models, so that the Regiment now has only the H model series of the UH-1.

(2) Training: Command emphasis has been placed on orientation checkouts, in-country orientations for newly assigned aviators and quarterly proficiency checks. An intensive transition program to cross-train aviators on the OH-6A is still in effect. This program allows greater flexibility in assigning aviators within the Aero Scout Platoon of the Air Cavalry Troop.

On the job training during the reporting period was conducted by the 398th Transportation Detachment to qualify crewchiefs and improve the proficiency of mechanics. Personnel were sent to formal courses in various maintenance fields as quotas became available.

(3) Maintenance: During the reporting period, the Direct Support maintenance unit was relocated from Blackhorse Base Camp to Red Catcher in LONG BINH. Despite less adequate facilities and the disruption caused by the move itself, aircraft availability showed no decline.

(See Annex D for Army Aviation Statistical Summary.)

b. Chemical:

(1) General: The 33rd Chemical Detachment provided personnel detection, CS drops, defoliation and chemical staff support to the Regiment during the reporting period.

(2) Personnel Detection: 141 Sniffer missions were flown in the Regimental AO using the XM3 Personnel Detector. Also, in conjunction with the S-5 PSYOP's, the 33rd Chemical Detachment began dropping leaflets during Sniffer missions. This action not only aided the Regimental S-5, but served to disguise the actual mission as well as obtain pinpoint delivery on trails, bunker complexes and any other areas frequented by the NVA/VC.

(3) CS Drops:

(a) A total of 300 E-158 clusters were dropped during the quarter. This was an increase over the previous period's usage due to the Regimental S-2 using the CS in a reconnaissance role. During September and October E-158 clusters were used on numerous occasions to exploit intelligence information in areas that were inaccessible by units of the Regiment. The CS clusters were dropped on suspected enemy positions and followed by visual reconnaissance and, if necessary, gunships and artillery were employed.

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(b) During the reporting period three drops of persistent CS were conducted to deny the enemy the use of large areas and bunker complexes. This is the first time that persistent CS has been used in the Regimental AO. A total of 150 drums were dropped.

(c) The 33rd Chemical Detachment has started producing persistent CS Bunker Restriction Bombs (BURB's) for squadron use to contaminate bunkers. The bombs are easy to use and will stand up under most weather conditions until used. One bomb will effectively contaminate a 4 x foot bunker. A total of 480 BURB's have been produced since production started in September.

(4) Defoliation:

(a) C-123 Defoliation: Requests were submitted for C-123 defoliation of Highways 13 and 14 in BINH LONG Province. The requests were refused at province level due to the danger of damaging the rubber trees.

(b) Ground Base Defoliation: The 33rd Chemical Detachment continued to provide support to the QUAN LOI defense by spraying around the base perimeter. Diesel fuel was used instead of defoliant. Also, the perimeter of FSB THUNDER IV was defoliated using 4,800 gallons of diesel fuel.

(5) Problem Area: The availability of E-158 CS clusters from the ammunition supply point (ASP) has been a problem. Even though the E-158 CS cluster was no longer on the available supply rate, the ASP's cannot keep enough on hand to meet the Regiment's needs. A stockage level of 60 E-158 CS clusters has been requested to be stocked by the QUAN LOI ASP for the 11th AC.

c. Signal: During this period the Regiment displaced its squadron and Regimental rear personnel and equipment to BIEN HOA. Communications equipment from Blackhorse Base Camp was installed in BIEN HOA for rear area command and control purposes. In addition, HF Tty communications (AN/GRC-142) was installed to provide adequate administrative and logistical communications support to rear areas. The 185th DS Maintenance Battalion, LONG BINH, entered the net on a daily basis in order that the growing logistical forward support areas could expedite their daily reports and requests.

The 185th HMSC provided a signal maintenance support capability to provide adequate and timely repair services in the forward areas. Initial results indicate that this service will cut the Regiment FM radio deadline rate considerably. A plan for DS evacuation of electronic and radio equipment is being formulated to cut down on turn around travel time.

Radio, wire, and messenger service were the same as in previous reports except that the G-2, G-3 Air, and FSCC Hot Lines were eliminated because of higher priorities established by the CASS. FM radio (secure) provided adequate communications to fill these pre-empted telephone links.

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Special task forces were formed for various operations within the AO. These task forces were provided command tracks from the HHT, 11th ACR. It was necessary to re-allocate two AN-VRC-46's, plus voice secure equipment to install in these tracks for Regimental command and control purposes.

d. Artillery:

(1) General: During the period 1 August to 31 October 1969, artillery provided direct and general support for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and its OPCON units. Intelligence determined targets, preparations, counter fires, SENSOR, SPAR, and Red Haze constitute the majority of types of missions fired.

(2) The artillery units providing direct and general support to the Regiment and its OPCON units, and the total rounds fired by each during the reporting period are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ROUNDS FIRED</u>
How/1/11 ACR	19,667
How/ /11 ACR	12,342
How/2/11 ACR	9,665
A/2-12 Arty	2,169
C/2-13 Arty	12,838
F/16 Arty	6,501
B/1-21 Arty	2,452
C/1-21 Arty	54
A/6-27 Arty	3,273
C/2-33 Arty	16,079
B/1-77 Arty	11,839
A/3-197 Arty	<u>962</u>
TOTAL	97,841

(3) The types of missions fired and the number and type of ordnance expended during the quarter is as follows:

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MISSIONS FIRED

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>ILL</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>FC</u>	<u>SMK</u>
SNIFFER	2,876		7		
SLAR	2,325				
SPAR	4,467				
RED HAZE	3,780				
INTEL/DT's	55,178	3,097	952	603	18
CONTACT	7,870	106	153	185	12
SENSORS	6,681		3		
PREPARATIONS	3,771		65		
COUNTER FIRE	3,062	64	11	98	
AS/ARC-LIGHT FOLLOW-UP	698				
OTHER	1,636		123		
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>92,344</u>	<u>3,267</u>	<u>1,314</u>	<u>886</u>	<u>30</u>

e. Engineer:

(1) General: During this reporting period, elements of the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) participated in Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR, while providing direct combat support to elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. One generator operator and one 30 Kw generator were dispatched to the SONG BE Bridge for light security in support of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). On 5 October, the generator and its operation were turned over to the 1st Cavalry and the generator operator returned to Blackhorse Base Camp.

(2) Operations:

(a) 1st Platoon: The 1st Platoon, 919th Engineer Company provided direct support for the 1st Squadron, 11th ACR.

During the first two weeks of August the 1st Platoon, working out of FSB FRIEDA in coordination with the 1st Squadron, conducted daily mine sweeps to

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the BEN CAT Bridge. From 16-22 August, the engineers, under the direction of the 1st Cavalry, began clearing land for LZ ANN. During this seven day period twenty-one bunkers were constructed and the area was encircled with more than sixteen hundred meters of triple standard concertina fence.

On 23 August, the 1st Platoon was divided. One squad of the platoon worked on the completion of a berm for LZ KELLY, another performed demolition work clearing fields of fire for the 1-16th Infantry at NDP ALLONS II, and the third squad was used as support in convoy operations from LOC NINH to QUAN LO.

On 1 September, one ACAV and a five man crew were attached to C Troop. Two days later, Track 31 and its crew went on a reconnaissance mission with C Troop and found twenty enemy bunkers. The following day, on another similar mission six miles northwest of LZ KELLY, two hundred fighting positions were discovered. The bunkers and the fighting positions were left in place.

On 5 September, LZ KELLY received incoming RPG, mortar, and recoilless rifle rounds for almost fifteen minutes. That morning, after the fire ceased, the engineers and C Troop conducted another reconnaissance. Enemy contact was made twice that day and the engineer cavalry team was credited with 12 NVA killed.

On 23 September, the engineers were called upon to construct a class 12 timber trestle bridge. This they did from natural materials, by wiring the pieces together. From 25 September to 11 October, the 1st Platoon laagered at FSB DEB. The first six days were spent constructing 1500 meters of berm, laying 200 meters of triple standard concertina fence, and reinforcing bunker positions to improve perimeter defense. From 3-11 October, the engineers conducted daily mine sweeps from FSB JON to FSB DEB, and along QL 13 from LOC NINH to FSB THUNDER IV. On 15 October, the 1st Platoon conducted a reconnaissance of five AVLB sites in the vicinity of FSB GWYN. The platoon returned to FSB GWYN and on 26 October was replaced by the 2nd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company.

(b) 2nd Platoon: During most of the quarter the 2nd Platoon, 919th Engineer Company, provided direct support for the 3rd Squadron, 11th ACR.

At the beginning of the reporting period the 2nd Platoon was operating out of Blackhorse Base Camp. They conducted daily mine sweeps north to XUAN LOC and, when required, south from Blackhorse Base Camp to the village of CAM MY. Two days after the mine sweep operations were completed and the road was opened, a 2½ ton truck struck a mine. The engineers were called upon to check the area and investigate the incident. While checking for other mines in the area, a squad leader was killed when he stepped on a mine located approximately 20 feet from the first.

On 5 September, the 2nd Platoon moved to FSB ASPEN II. The next day the engineers, OPCON to M Company on a mine sweep operation, was ambushed southwest of AN LOC. During the contact five engineers were wounded and had to

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be evacuated. On this same day one mine was found and blown in place, and five others were struck by vehicles.

On 12 September, the 2nd Platoon was replaced by the 3rd Platoon, and the 2nd Platoon came to QUAN LOI to support the 919th Engineer Company Headquarters. From 14-21 September, the platoon provided security for the closing of FSB's ALLONS II and EAGLE II. On 21 September, the engineers returned to QUAN LOI and began construction of a 30 x 45 foot command bunker to house the administrative and operations sections of the 919th Engineers.

From 5-11 October, the platoon widened and repaired a bridge at XT757833 and constructed and placed culverts at the same location. In addition, the engineers conducted regular mine sweeps and reconnaissance in the area. From 17-25 October, the platoon conducted a reconnaissance for AVLB sites on Route 304, east of QL 13, for seven kilometers. On 26 October, the 2nd Platoon road marched to FSB GWYN.

(c) 3rd Platoon: During the reporting period the 3rd Platoon of the 919th Engineer Company provided support for the 11th ACR from 1 August to 12 September, and direct support for the 3rd Squadron, 11th ACR, from 13 September to 31 October.

During the first week of August, the 3rd Platoon worked on various construction projects at QUAN LOI, improving the bunker line and command bunker of Red Sector, plus building ACAV revetments. On 12 August, the platoon played a major role in plugging the hole in the perimeter of QUAN LOI. The perimeter had been attacked by enemy ground troops, the wire had been breached, and the enemy were within the base camp. The engineers aided in the evacuation of the wounded and in holding a 200 meter front until reinforcements arrived. For the remainder of August and early September the platoon constructed bunkers at QUAN LOI.

On 14 September, the platoon, OPCON to M Company, moved to FSB ASPEN II. The engineers remained there for the rest of September providing security and daily mine sweeps in the ASPEN II area. The mines found in this area were either conventional Chicom mines or mines constructed from butterfly bombs. All findings were destroyed.

On 6 October, the 3rd Platoon moved to a new NDP at XT705924 and performed demolition work in the area. Later in the month the engineers moved to NDP EAGLE I and cleared the area of enemy fortifications and obstacles. On 23 October, the platoon left NDP EAGLE I and laagered at XT698928. The 3rd Platoon continued as direct support for 3/11 ACR through 31 October.

(d) 4th Platoon: The 4th Platoon, 919th Engineer Company, provided direct support for the 2nd Squadron, 11th ACR.

For the last part of July and the beginning of August, the 4th Platoon was located at FSB ASPEN. The engineers improved the perimeter defenses by

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setting up trip flares and constructing a forty-three foot tower. They also conducted daily mine sweeps and culvert reconnaissance between DUC VINH and THUNDER III.

On 5 August, the platoon moved from FSB ASPEN to NDP EAGLE. The following day the engineers left NDP EAGLE to check culverts along QL 13 from AN LOC to FSB THUNDER III. In addition, the platoon was given the mission to proceed to AN LOC and recover a fifty thousand gallon fuel tanker that had overturned along the convoy route at XT756880. After 4½ hours of work, the tanker was recovered with its load intact and was escorted to QUAN LOI.

On 7 August, the 4th Platoon departed QUAN LOI and was given the mission to build FSB EAGLE II, large enough for 2/11 ACR, two ARVN artillery pieces, and an ARVN battalion headquarters. Sixty percent of the berm was completed after the first day of work. The berm and gun positions were completed on the second day.

On 9 August, the platoon departed FSB EAGLE II to construct a new access to FSB ASPEN. An entrance was cut into the berm and covered with twelve inch diameter logs. The platoon then returned to QUAN LOI for maintenance of their weapons and vehicles.

On 11 August, the engineers supported 1-16th Inf (MECH) in the construction of FSB ALLONS II. Before construction could begin, extensive land clearing of dense bamboo and trees had to be done. The next day work was continued on ALLONS II-- fields of fire were cleared and tangle-foot barbed wire and concertina wire were implaced.

The platoon remained at FSB ALLONS II through the month of August. During this period they conducted numerous mine sweeps and accomplished several demolition missions in the area.

On 1 September, the platoon moved to DI AN where they remained until 10 October, pulling maintenance on their vehicles, putting in concertina fence and trip flares to improve perimeter defense, conducting classes on mine sweeping and demolitions for the benefit of 2/11 ACR personnel, and constructing quarters for 2/11 ACR. The platoon also aided in the construction of non-permanent structures at BIEN HOA in preparation for the phasing out of Blackhorse Base Camp and the move of Blackhorse Rear to BIEN HOA.

The platoon left DI AN and laagered at FSB MARGE on 10 October. For the remainder of the reporting period the engineers conducted mine sweep operations, bridge site reconnaissance, and improved the perimeter defense of FSB MARGE.

(3) Maintenance: During the quarter the majority of the maintenance section was located at QUAN LOI, providing maintenance support for the 919th Engineer Company. The men and heavy equipment of the section aided

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in the successful completion of the individual missions of the platoons. The remainder of the Maintenance Section stationed at Blackhorse Base Camp supported the 919th Engineers in their move to BIEN HOA and QUAN LOI.

- (4) New Equipment: One 5-ton Dump Truck
One 1½ Kw Generator
Two Bridges

(5) Base Camp Development: During the reporting period the 919th Engineer Company (Armored) concentrated on phasing out Blackhorse Base Camp and transporting the men and equipment to BIEN HOA and then QUAN LOI. A rear area for the company to store equipment not needed for forward operations and quarters for personnel in transit was established at BIEN HOA. The move from Blackhorse Base Camp to QUAN LOI began on 24 October, and by 27 October the Administrative, Operations, Supply, Mess and Maintenance Sections were settled at QUAN LOI.

5. (C) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT:

a. Logistics:

(1) General: The most significant logistics activity during the reporting period was the closing of Blackhorse Base Camp. The installation was turned over to the 18th Division (ARVN). In formal ceremonies on 24 October, thus shortening the 11th ACR's lines of communication and closing out all support from the 51st Light Maintenance Company and the 506th Supply and Services Detachment under the BEAR CAT LSA. The 29th General Support Group and the 3rd Ordnance Battalion (ammunition) provided continuous logistical support during the quarter, with the 185th Maintenance Battalion and the 266th Supply and Services Battalion assuming all maintenance and supply support as Blackhorse was closed out.

(2) Supply:

(a) Class I: Rations were drawn from the nearest Class I point. During Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR rations were drawn from the 15th S&S Bn, 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM) at QUAN LOI. The 3rd Squadron training at Blackhorse was supported by the 506th S&S Detachment.

(b) Class II: Individual clothing and equipment continued to be drawn from the 266th S&S and no problems were encountered.

(c) Class III: Class III was drawn from both 15th S&S in QUAN LOI and 506th S&S in Blackhorse during the quarter. The 1st Squadron, operating in LOC NINH, was supplied by fixed wing from 1st Cavalry Division Support Command in BIEN HOA.

(d) Class IV: Barrier materials were again a problem

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during the quarter. The 15th S&S Bn was unable to issue any barrier material because their assets on hand were designated as firebase kits and could not be broken up. Therefore, all barrier materials had to be drawn by the Regiment and transported to QUAN LOI. The problem of controlling the issue of barrier material was solved by storing all the barrier materials at a Class IV yard co-located with the 919th Engineer Company at QUAN LOI. Regimental S-4 determined the allocations and authorized issues through the 919th Engineer Company.

During the period USARV began controlling sandbags. The Regiment was allocated 200,000 sandbags for the months of September and October. These sandbags were drawn and further allocated to the units. The allocation satisfied the Regiment's minimum requirements.

(e) Class V: Class V was drawn from the 3rd Ordnance Bn or the QUAN LOI ASP. The ammunition holding area at Blackhorse Base Camp was closed in October.

(f) Class VII:

1 From the beginning of the reporting period to 6 September, 3rd Squadron was at Blackhorse Base Camp to receive its initial issue of the M551 Sheridan. The Squadron turned in 18 of its oldest M113A1's for receipt of 27 M551's. These were the phase II M551's, incorporating many of the modifications requested by the 1st Squadron as a result of their combat operations with the M551 since February. Some of the major modifications were: Mine protective side armor, a removable commander's control handle which could be positioned in the cupola, engine access panel in the rear of the turret compartment, grease fittings for the roadwheel lubrication system, and a turret floor access hatch.

2 During September, the 2nd Squadron moved to DI AN to to receive its issue of M551 Sheridans. Again, 18 ACAV's were exchanged for 27 M551's, completing the Regimental issue.

3 The ACTIV evaluation of the M113A1, APC launched Bridge (Ensure 84) was completed during September. The 1st Squadron determined the vehicle was unsatisfactory for use by the Regiment since the bridge would not hold the weight of an M551.

4 When A Troop, 11th ACR, moved by air to BU DOP, a lift capability was required for maintenance support. The M578 tracked recovery vehicle and the M543 5-ton wrecker, organic to the Regiment, were both too large for a C130. A 3-ton, rough terrain crane was obtained from the depot on a 180 day temporary loan and was flown to BU DOP where it proved to be an excellent vehicle for pulling packs and moving bulk ammunition loads.

5 In September, the 919th Engineer Company drew a tank mounted mine roller from the 25th Infantry Division. After the roller was

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brought to QUAN LOI, it was discovered that some parts were missing and it could not be utilized immediately. At the end of the reporting period, the parts were being fabricated by the 185th Maintenance Battalion.

6 In late October, the first of the M551 commander's shields arrived at QUAN LOI. A box-like shelf, which mounts on the TC's cupola, protects the TC from small-arms fire and shell fragments. Twenty-seven arrived in this initial shipment and were split equally among the three squadrons.

(g) Class IX: The mission of repair parts supply for the 11th ACR was assumed by the 185th Maintenance Battalion as the 551st LM was closed out. A significant improvement in the supply reaction time was made by the establishment of a verbal requisition form to transmit high priority requisitions by telephone or radio. In October, a team reviewed each squadron's PLL records, noted the zero balances, and then searched depot stocks to insure a PLL fill. Also during October, the 185th Technical Supply identified 800 ASL lines as fast as moving parts and established a forward service stock at QUAN LOI to provide more responsive supply service. The service stock expedited requisitioning for all 11th ACR units in the QUAN LOI area, and plans were in process for adding DX capability.

(h) Aerial Resupply:

1 Rotary Wing: During Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR rotary wing resupply was provided by II FFORCEV. During the August high point, 40-50 sorties per day were required. A CH54 was utilized to retrograde battle damaged ACAV's.

2 Fixed Wing: Fixed wing resupply was used extensively in the LOC NINH area. The squadron was required to submit requests 48 hours in advance of required resupply. This system proved to be unreliable and the supplies were not delivered when needed. Fixed wing resupply had to be heavily augmented with rotary wing resupply.

(3) Maintenance:

(a) Scheduled Maintenance Operations: In July, the 11th A R outlined a maintenance program for August which gave each maneuver troop one week of maintenance during the month. This program was presented to the Commanding General, II FFORCEV, and was disapproved. An alternate program of 3-5 day maintenance periods for platoons or platoon equivalents was approved and was initiated in August. The platoon maintenance operations had built-in disadvantages in that the troop chain of command was missing, the troop maintenance effort was directed toward keeping the maneuvering platoons rolling, and a relatively inexperienced platoon leader was saddled with the responsibility of organizing, coordinating and supervising the maintenance program. The platoon maintenance programs were barely underway when the 12 August attacks disrupted the scheduling, and maintenance was done on an as needed basis.

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By September, the platoon programs were well underway, but the deadline rate continued to climb. In October, the Acting Commanding General of II FFORCEV directed that troop maintenance periods be scheduled and performed. With the increased maintenance effort at troop/company level, the deadline rate greatly improved. At the end of the quarter, the original troop maintenance program and the end of the rainy season left the Regiment in a good maintenance posture.

(b) Combat Vehicle Repair and Return (R&R) Program: In August, the Deputy Commanding General of USARV proposed that 11th ACR high mileage vehicles be sent to LONG BINH for complete servicing at fixed maintenance facilities to extend their operational life. It was agreed that the program would work if the vehicles could be transported the 76 miles to LONG BINH and back without having to make a 150 mile roadmarch. The program was set up in cooperation with the 185th Maintenance Battalion and a portion of their property was designated as the R&R area. The first vehicles rolled in for R&R on 19 August.

In 2½ months the R&R maintenance program had an impressive record, completing the following vehicles:

M551	7
M48A3	4
M113	26
M548	3
AVLB	1
OTHER	1

The program was received with mixed feelings-- the commanders noting the loss of operational vehicles for a period of time, the crews praising the opportunity to perform intensive maintenance without the pressures of combat operations and no night time security problems. Overall, the program proved highly successful and, during the last part of the quarter, plans were being made to initiate a special R&R program for the M109 Howitzers to improve their maintenance status.

(c) Forward Support Area Concept: At the end of July, the 185th Maintenance Battalion restructured their contact team support to have one contact team with each squadron. This organization provided support to the squadrons but, when all squadrons arrived at QUAN LOI during October, it became obvious that there had to be some means of coordinating the supply and maintenance efforts of the three separate teams. In late October, the 185th Maintenance Battalion sent a representative to QUAN LOI to coordinate all maintenance activities, establish a service stock supply activity, establish a forward electronics repair shop, control maintenance float and establish a retrograde collection point. Saigon Support Command sent a representative to QUAN LOI to coordinate all support activities to include maintenance, supply and ammunition.

(d) Electronics Repair: Because of the distance from QUAN LOI to the electronics repair facility in LONG BINH, a large part of the downtime was due to evacuation time and return shipment time. To alleviate this, the 185th Maintenance Bn outfitted an M109 shop van with a test

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bench, repair parts and signal generator, and sent it to QUAN LOI. Set up in the Regimental communications area in October, the signal repair shop paid immediate dividends in providing close response maintenance support and reducing the radio downtime.

(e) Retrograde: Recovery and evacuation of unservicable vehicles continued to be a major problem. Recovery was complicated by terrain during the wet season, but the addition of seven new M578's in August helped alleviate that problem. The CH54 "Flying Crane" was utilized at least once by each squadron during the quarter to evacuate M113 vehicles from inaccessible locations.

(f) 185th Maintenance Battalion Liaison: During the period 1 August to 31 October, several actions were taken to improve coordination and speed supply communications between QUAN LOI and LONG BINH.

1 In August, a representative was sent from the Regiment to the 185th Maintenance Bn to handle the daily deadline report and parts requisitions. He worked in the material office and became the point of contact for reports and daily coordination. His presence at the 185th Materiel Office provided the Regiment with an always available "ear" for 11th ACR problems.

2 To further increase supply and maintenance coordination, the 11th ACR courier flight was routed to stop at the 185th Maintenance Bn pad. The aircraft was normally on the ground less than a minute, only long enough to drop the daily deadline report and the squadrons' requisitions, then pick up any parts or messages returning to QUAN LOI. The seven additional minutes of flight time daily, saved up to two days transit time for requisitions and reports, and proved to be a most valuable investment for maintenance and supply support.

3 In late October, the 185th installed a RTT unit at LONG BINH that netted with the 11th ACR at QUAN LOI. This added a "hard copy" means of communications with the 185th, and provided another method of rapidly passing supply and maintenance information.

(g) During the period of stand down when the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons picked up the M551 vehicles, USARV conducted CMMI inspections. The results of the inspections are as follows:

1 3rd Squadron, 21-25 August:

	<u>MATERIEL</u>	<u>MAINT OPNS</u>	<u>FINAL</u>
HHT	80	70	Sat
I	73	79	Sat
K	75	87	Sat
L	80	89	Sat
How	78	79	Sat

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2 2nd Squadron, 21-25 August:

	<u>MATERIEL</u>	<u>MAINT OPNS</u>	<u>FINAL</u>
INT			Unsat
E	70	89	Sat
F	78	75	Sat

3 Units not listed were not inspected due to operational commitments.

(h) Combat Damage: Mines continued to be the single largest source of maintenance headaches to the Regiment. Mine damage accounted for the bulk of combat loss vehicles, and those vehicles that were not lost accounted for a significant portion of the maintenance downtime. Combat damage figures are shown below-- mine damage figures are shown in parenthesis:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
M551	2 (1)	2 (0)	3 (3)
M48A3	20 (15)	5 (5)	4 (4)
M113A1	13 (4)	7 (2)	3 (3)

b. Medical:

(1) General: The general health of the Regiment during the reportable period continues to reflect progress inspite of the continued wet season and heavy, sporadic enemy contact in the QUAN LOI/LOC NINH area. Medical statistics indicate various increases and decreases concerning non-battle injuries, man-days lost, and certain diseases such as malarial, diarrheal, respiratory, venereal, and dermatological. All fluctuations are directly related to the season and increase/decrease in tactical activity. The Regimental Surgeon has placed maximum emphasis on high standards involving preventive medicine, sanitary discipline, quality of flight physicals, and civic action programs.

(2) Non-battle injuries reported through Regimental medical channels vary from abrasions to injuries of a serious nature requiring hospitalization and evacuation out of the Republic of Vietnam. During the period the total number of non-battle injuries again averaged 211 per month, the same as last quarter. The battle casualty rate has declined each month from 233/1000/year in August to 165/1000/year in September to 35/1000/year in October.

(3) Significant diseases diagnosed during the period are as follows:

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<u>DISEASE</u>	<u>ADMIN RATE</u> <u>PER/1000/YEAR</u>
Infectious Hepatitis	2.71
Malaria	84.74
Diarrheal	35.34
Veneroal	157.47
Dermatological	23.62
Infectious Mononucleosis	1.80

(Note: Percentage comparison with last quarter could not be computed because of a change in statistical reporting procedures adopted by USARV during the quarter.)

(4) The hospitals utilized during the quarter are as follows: 2nd Surgical Hospital, LAI KHE; 3rd Field Hospital, SAIGON; 6th Convalescent Center, CAM RANH BAY; 12th Evacuation Hospital, CU CHI; 24th Evacuation Hospital, LONG BINH; 36th Evacuation Hospital, VUNG TAU (deactivated 15 Oct 69); and 93rd Evacuation Hospital, LONG BINH.

(5) MEDCAP activities have increased markedly from 2666 Vietnamese treated last quarter to 7592 treated this quarter. The 37th Medical Company established four MEDCAP teams (one for HHT and one for each squadron) to carry out an extensive MEDCAP PROGRAM in the QUAN LOI/LOC NINH area. So far, the 37th Medical Company's team and the squadron teams have had tremendous success.

(6) During the first part of this quarter there was a noted increase in the malaria rate and several serious cases of diarrheal disease which, during a three-day period, affected the combat readiness of the Air Cavalry Troop. In order to reduce the occurrence of malaria within the Regiment, the Regimental Commander initiated stringent malaria prevention policies in September and also established a Regimental Preventive Medicine Team. This team conducted inspections and also trained individual unit preventive medicine/sanitation teams who will be responsible for sanitary conditions within their respective units. The Regimental Commander also directed weekly spray missions at all 11th ACR field locations to reduce incidence of disease.

(7) 37th Medical Company:

(a) Mission: The 37th Medical Company's ability to operate as a medical company has been hampered tremendously since it left Blackhorse Base Camp in the first part of October. Having to operate in three different areas (Red Catcher - LONG BINH, Air Cavalry Troop - BIEN HOA, and QUAN LOI) and being situated in temporary transient facilities, made mission accomplishment impossible. In the near future the 37th Medical Company will occupy an ideal permanent medical facility on BIEN HOA Post which will better allow the Company to accomplish its assigned mission with the 11th ACR.

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(b) Vehicles: During this quarter the 37th Medical Company requested and received six new 1/2-ton front line ambulances to replace the same number of 3/4-ton ambulances. This change has greatly improved the mobility and safety of wheeled evacuation during a combat situation. Several 3/4-ton ambulances will be retained for courier and mass evacuation purposes. This change in types of ambulances within the Company was initiated in anticipation of a MTOE change presently at DA and to increase the effectiveness of the Company as an integral part of the 11th ACR.

(c) Medical Supply: Medical supply has been another problem of grave concern in the Regiment. Two squadrons were at all times OPCON to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), operating in the QUAN LOI area. During portions of the quarter one squadron was OPCON to the 1st Infantry Division, or the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. Hence, medical resupply was accomplished by a number of different units. Only at Blackhorse Base Camp was medical resupply made directly by the Regimental Medical Supply Officer. At QUAN LOI, the Regiment was supplied by B and C Companies, 15th Medical Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division (AM). A few items seemed practically impossible to acquire. For example, ampicillian, v-cillin, hydrocortisone, cough syrup, paragoric, and diarrheal mixtures were particularly scarce. Because of this, operation of the Company was taxed very heavily in that it was called to resupply the Regiment's widely separated squadrons from Blackhorse Base Camp and BIEN HOA. To alleviate this problem, the Regimental Medical Supply Officer coordinated with the XO (Supply Officer) of C Co, 15th Medical Bn, 1st Cav Div (AM), located at QUAN LOI. The following agreement was made:

1 That a medical supply clerk from the 37th Medical Company would work at C Co, 15th Medical Bn, to order and disperse medical supplies to 11th ACR units.

2 That all emergency supply requests that cannot be filled by C Co, 15th Medical Bn, will be supplied by the 37th Medical Company within 36-48 hours.

3 The 37th Medical Company will also resupply C Co, 15th Medical Bn, on a regular basis for medical supplies dispersed to 11th ACR units.

(8) Quality flight physicals is an area where the Regimental Flight Surgeon has always placed a great deal of emphasis. In order to improve the accuracy of the testing procedures and to greatly reduce the amount of time required to conduct a flight physical, the Flight Surgeon has ordered an EKG machine and an audiometer for the Air Cavalry Troop aid station. Upon receipt and installation of this equipment along with the immediate availability of the lab and X-ray facilities of the 37th Medical Company, the desired accuracy and reduction in exam completion time will be achieved.

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6. (FOUO) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION:

a. Strength:

(1) Strength Figures by Month:

	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	<u>PDY</u>
AUG	4384	4479	4262
SEP	4384	4443	4241
OCT	4384	4433	4288

(2) Casualties:

	<u>KHA</u>	<u>WHA</u>	<u>MHA</u>	<u>NED</u>	<u>NEW</u>
AUG	15	269	1	0	21
SEP	13	132	0	2	13
OCT	2	26	0	2	14

(3) Hospital Returnees: During the period 1 August to 31 October, 251 personnel were returned to duty after hospitalization. This figure does not include personnel who were treated and released immediately.

b. MOS Shortages:

<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>SHORTAGES</u>
05B	64	12
13B	72	10
17K	123	90
45G	39	10
63C	254	18

c. Replacements: Generally, junior enlisted replacements have been arriving as scheduled. The above shortages are USARV wide and primarily due to unavailability of stateside EM for assignment overseas.

d. Services:

(1) Religion: Due to the turnover of Blackhorse Base Camp to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, the Regimental Chapel was relocated at

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BIEN HOA. The new Blackhorse Chapel was dedicated on 19 October 1969.

There are a total of forty-four services a week, with an average overall attendance of 800 men. Every troop-size unit is provided with religious services on Sunday. This is possible due to the cooperation of commanders and through the judicious use of the Regimental helicopter assigned to the chaplain section.

(2) Special Services:

(a) The Blackhorse Service Club was opened at Blackhorse Base Camp on 10 August. The club was the largest in the Republic with almost 15,000 square feet of floor space. The club was closed on 10 September.

(b) There were only two USO shows during the quarter. One took place at the opening of the service club, and the other was held in the service club auditorium in cooperation with the 199th Light Infantry Brigade. Movies were shown to all units of the Regiment during the quarter.

(c) Since the base camp has been relocated to BIEN HOA, an athletic program has been planned. A complete report of this activity will be presented next quarter.

(3) Information: During the reporting period the main emphasis in utilization of manpower and facilities was placed on upgrading the quantity and quality of photographic output for public and command information purposes. Construction of an operable mobile photo laboratory played the biggest part in this effort. A 2½-ton van had been acquired and the equipment necessary for its conversion to a mobile photo lab was obtained within the Regiment in early September. Construction of the laboratory took two weeks.

Publicity concerning the Regiment has remained at a high level due to continued success in inducing civilian and military newsmen and photographers to cover Regimental events. This was particularly evident in regard to the Regimental awards ceremony on 7 August, and the turnover of Blackhorse Base Camp to the 18th Infantry Division (ARVN) on 24 October.

Publication of the Blackhorse Newspaper has continued to be effective despite several staff changes due to departing personnel. Personal distribution of the newspaper by detachment personnel has been instituted in an effort to provide more equitable distribution to troops in the field. Also, a mailing list has been compiled in order to share the publication with other units and with former members of the Regiment.

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

News Releases	21
Photographic Releases	72
Hometown News Releases	395
Visiting Media: ABC, CBS, NBC, Associated Press, United Press International,	

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New York Daily News, International Telenews, and numerous Vietnamese publications.

(4) Postal:

(a) The 7th Army Postal Unit is operating at TOE strength, which is one officer and 15 enlisted men.

(b) The total value of money orders sold, including fees, was \$1,093,000.67. The total number of money orders sold was 14,301, while 522 money orders were cashed for a total value of \$43,474.53. The total stamp sales for the period was \$9,856.00.

(c) The following is a breakdown of incoming and outgoing mail for the period 1 August to 31 October:

	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>DISPATCHED</u>
Pouches (letter mail)	650	690
Sacks (parcel post)	2900	1600
Outside Pieces	1435	680
Registered Mail	1925	360
Insured Mail	820	512

(d) During the reporting period airmail was received at the 7th APU 85 days, and surface mail 4 days. The average transit time was 5 days for airmail, and 48 days for surface mail.

(e) The parcel post, money order and locator windows are open daily from 0830 to 1130 hours, and from 1230 to 1630 hours, seven days a week. Also, three money order clerks service 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment personnel in the field approximately five days per month.

(5) Post Exchange: During the reporting period the Regimental Post Exchange at Blackhorse Base Camp was closed down. At present, construction of a snack bar is underway at BIEN HOA.

(6) Red Cross: During the period 1 August to 31 October, the Red Cross Field Unit handled 892 cases. A total of 126 emergency leaves were granted, and 36 requests for hardship discharges were received. Also, loans made for emergency leaves totaled \$1,845.

d. Awards and Decorations:

(1) Statistical Summary:

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<u>AWARD</u>	<u>APPROVED</u>	<u>PENDING</u>
CMH	0	3
DSC	4	10
LM	3	3
SS	170	61
DFC	35	13
SM	4	4
BSM	240	236
AM	602	374
ACM	1,617	484
BSM "V"	217	161
AM "V"	20	5
ACM "V"	65	84
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	2,976	1,441

(2) Foreign Awards -- Statistical Summary

<u>AWARD</u>	<u>APPROVED</u>	<u>PENDING</u>
National Order of RVN, 5th Class	4	1
Gallantry Cross with Palm	1	0
Gallantry Cross with Gold Star	12	0
Gallantry Cross with Silver Star	92	21
Gallantry Cross with Bronze Star	157	71
Army Dist'd Service Medal, 2nd Class	3	0
Armed Forces Honor Medal, 1st Class	31	17
Armed Forces Honor Medal, 2nd Class	13	10
Armor Badge	23	0
Staff Service Medal, 1st	3	0
Civic Actions Honor Medal	1	1
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>340</u>	<u>121</u>

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f. Maintenance of Discipline:

(1) Courts-Martial Status:

	<u>TRIED</u>	<u>CONVICTIONS</u>	<u>PENDING</u>
General	0	0	0
Special	18	16	3
Summary	0	0	0

(2) The courts-martial during the quarter involved the following offenses:

<u>UCMJ ARTICLE NO.</u>	<u>NO. TIMES CHARGED</u>	<u>NO. CONVICTIONS</u>
86	9	7
89	1	1
90	3	3
91	7	6
92	6	6
99	1	1
108	1	1
119	1	1
134	3	2

7. (FCMO) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:

a. General: The past three months have seen the most active PSYOP in the history of the Regiment. Over 25 million leaflets were dropped, over 100 aerial speaker hours were flown, and over 100 ground speaker hours were broadcast. All attest to the PSYOP response to the increase in enemy activity.

b. Ralliers: The major portion of PSYOP aerial activity has been in support of the "Chieu Hoi" Program. PSYOP tactical missions, both leaflet and loudspeaker, have been flown during or immediately after almost every contact. Two ground tactical missions were conducted, one on the morning of 12 August in an effort to talk surviving sappers out of the bunkers, culverts, and tall grass around QUAN LOI. Chieu Hoi Missions were flown on numerous intelligence targets, i. e. SPAR's, SLAR's, base camp areas, trails et cetera.

It is difficult to give credit to any one unit for a specific rallier, and ralliers are generally afraid to rally to a US unit. However, the Regiment has had 3 NVA rally to them on one occasion, 1 NVA on another instance, and on still another occasion, 6 NVA surrendered to the Regiment due largely to aerial speaker instructions.

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Of greater importance are statistics on ralliers before and during Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR, in BINH LONG Province.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NO. RALLIERS</u>
MAY	15
JUN	15
KENTUCKY COUGAR	
JUL	15
AUG	45
SEP	52
OCT (thru 16 Oct)	18

c. Volunteer Informant Program: The volunteer informant program was heavily stressed in an effort to reduce the number of mining incidents which have caused considerable damage to Regimental vehicles. As in the past, this program stresses rewards for information concerning mines, booby traps, caches, et cetera. The rewards are in the form of monetary payment, or the equivalent value in rice. Recently more stress has been made on the SVN citizens patriotic obligation to give this information, rather than monetary inducement. It remains to be seen how effective this approach will be.

d. Popular Attitude: Although the attitude of the populace in the Regimental AO cannot be described as overwhelming enthusiasm for the GVN, it is definitely improving. A number of ralliers have indicated that local villagers now refuse to cooperate in assisting the VC, and no longer provide them with food. Also, the intense civil action work done by the 11th ACR, ARVN, and local RF/PT units contrast strongly with VC terrorism.

8. (FOUO) CIVIC ACTION:

a. General: Civic activities during the August through October period were characterized by an increase in type and quantity. MEDCAP's, DENTCAP's, and ICAP's were increased almost twofold over the previous reporting period. This was due partially to decreased enemy activity in the later half of the reporting period, increased support for the CVN Pacification Program, and to all squadrons being under Regimental control.

An unusual project undertaken by the Regiment was extensive and intensive mine sweep operations in and around the rubber near AN LOC and LOC NINH. While the project cannot be described as totally civic action, it did have significant impact on the civilian economy. Since 60% of the population depends on rubber for a living, it is imperative that roads through the plantations be kept open to allow access to all areas of the plantation.

Also undertaken was the training and use of ARVN and RF/PT medics on MEDCAP's and DENTCAP's. This program is designed to ultimately have the Vietnamese forces conduct their own MEDCAP and DENTCAP operations.

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A joint project involving the 11th ACR, the 3rd Bde of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), and the 6th Bn of the 27th Arty was initiated to help construct a day-room at the new provincial hospital in AN LOC. To date, the 11th ACR has contributed 30,000 \$VN.

b. Commodities Distributed:

Cement	400 lbs	Food	3,000 lbs
Tin sheets	50	Clothing	50 lbs
Lumber	3,000 Bd ft	Health Items	500 lbs
Paint	15 gals		

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

1. (C) LESSONS LEARNED

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations:

(1) OBSERVATION: Travel across the grain in rubber plantations slows the movement of armored vehicles.

EVALUATION: When using armor in rubber plantations, units should avoid crossing against the grain. This slows the unit down, reduces its maneuverability, and consequently makes it vulnerable to enemy fire.

RECOMMENDATION: If tactically possible, travel with the grain in rubber plantations.

(2) OBSERVATION: There is a need for an adequate number of ambush patrols and outposts.

EVALUATION: An inadequate number of ambush patrols and outposts was employed in the defense phase of the Battle of HINH LONG Province. Hence, essential early warning was sometimes not provided.

RECOMMENDATION: More aggressive patrolling activities should be conducted to help provide early warning of enemy attack.

(3) OBSERVATION: The use of check points makes rapid deployment of reinforcements possible.

EVALUATION: The use of check points in controlling troop

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movements during the counterattack and pursuit phase is a simple and effective technique.

RECOMMENDATION: Check points should be used to the maximum extent compatible with comsec requirements.

(4) OBSERVATION: Battle drill assures good troop reaction.

EVALUATION: Battle drill is necessary if vehicle crews are to react properly during contact. This is especially true when communication fail or key leaders are wounded or killed.

RECOMMENDATION: Battle drill should be conducted whenever and wherever the tactical situation permits.

(5) OBSERVATION: When conducting joint operations with RVNAF units, close coordination is necessary.

EVALUATION: When conducting combined operations with RVNAF units, close coordination and liaison is absolutely necessary. Each commander must be certain that his counterpart has and understands the plans of his units. This type of close cooperation made a major contribution to the success of the counterattack on 11 - 13 August.

RECOMMENDATION: Plans should be formulated and coordinated to the maximum extent possible.

(6) OBSERVATION: An armored cavalry troop can make a tactical move by fixed wing aircraft in a combat environment.

EVALUATION: An airlift of an armored cavalry troop can be made in detaining or pre-empting enemy attacks. The appearance of armored vehicles in areas the NVA/VC had thought inaccessible to armor doubtless contributed to the surprise.

RECOMMENDATION: Tactical airlift of an armored cavalry troop shall be considered in future operations.

(7) OBSERVATION: The weights listed in air movement data guides (TB 55-46) and vehicular TM's do not agree.

EVALUATION: The preparation for an airlift of a reconnaissance troop is hampered by the irregularities, as to weight and configuration, presented in TM's.

RECOMMENDATION: An investigation should be conducted concerning such inconsistencies and the vehicle' manuals should be updated to coincide.

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c. Training: None.

d. Intelligence: OBSERVATION: Anti-tank Mining.

EVALUATION: A study of enemy mining activity in BINH LONG Province since 1 June 1969, has revealed that anti-tank mining activity is not solely confined to existing roads and trails.

RECOMMENDATION: In the future it is recommended that the mine detecting assets of the Regiment be employed more extensively.

e. Logistics: None.

f. Signal: None.

g. Medical: None.

h. Base Camp Development: None.

i. PSYOP/Civic Action:

(1) OBSERVATION: VC/NVA consistently become airsick after a short time in a helicopter.

EVALUATION: An airsick rallier is of no use in convincing fellow soldiers to rally.

RECOMMENDATION: All ralliers that show potential for immediate use in a speaker broadcast should be kept on the ground as long as possible before flying the PSYOPS mission. As soon after rallying as possible, the rallier should make a "Chieu Hoi" tape, so that the mission can continue to be flown should the rallier become sick or otherwise unavailable.

(2) OBSERVATION: Ground loudspeakers and bullhorns cannot be heard when used from tanks or ACAV's due to vehicle noise.

EVALUATION: Ground broadcasts from armored vehicles serve no purpose while the vehicles are running.

RECOMMENDATION: Ground tactical broadcasts in support of armored operations should be made by the speaker team with a small dismounted escort, 50 - 100 meters in advance of the armored element.

(3) OBSERVATION: PSYOP in support of contact is often ineffective since the speaker-ship must work around artillery, TAC Air and gunships.

EVALUATION: This problem predicates a hit-or-miss coverage of the area, and affords little or no chance for potential ralliers to rally.


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RECOMMENDATION: Insofar as the tactical situation permits, the PSYOP ship should be given a short period of time to broadcast its message initially, and a similar period after artillery, TAC Air, gunships, et cetera, to afford the enemy a chance to rally.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incl
as
Incl 2 wd HQ, DA


W. RALPH HILL
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant

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AVDAGT-DT (22 November 1969) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period Ending
31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

DA, HQ, 1st Cavalry Division (AM), APO San Francisco 96400, 6 Dec 69

TO: Commanding General
II Field Force, Vietnam
ATTN: AVFBC-RE-N
APO San Francisco 96266

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1969, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and concurs with the report.

2. Report is forwarded in compliance with USARV Reg. 525-15.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Kenneth R. S. AIM
KENNETH R. S. AIM
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

AVFBC-RE-H (22 Nov 69) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for Period
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 962661 4 DEC 1969


THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for the period ending
31 October 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


B. G. McDONALD
ILT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (22 Nov 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 17071

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Defoliation", section I, page 18, paragraph 4b(4)(a); concur. Defoliation is primarily a responsibility of the GVN. While it may enhance a unit's defense capability, if it is used without prior coordination and planning, it could destroy valuable income crops. Indiscriminate defoliation could cause a breakdown in US-VN relations and set back the pacification effort.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Operations" (Check Points), section II, page 38, paragraph 1b(3); concur. This headquarters recognizes that quick reaction, maneuver and flexibility are inherent to the mission of an Armored Cavalry Regiment and that the use of check point systems for command and control purposes assists in the rapid movement of troops. However, every precaution must be taken to insure that this type of check point system is not used as an unauthorized point of origin code.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Operations" (Weights of Vehicles), section II, page 39, paragraph 1b(7); concur. However, the unit does not specifically state what vehicles or TM's are not properly listed. A review of TB 55-46 dated August 1968 indicates that units should report errors, omissions, and recommendations for improvement to the Director, US Army Transportation Engineering Agency's Military Traffic Management and Terminal Services, ATTN: MIT-GDA, Fort Eustis, Va., 23604. Many problems in weight variances could be caused by unit imposed modifications.

d. (U) Reference item concerning "PSIOP/Civic Action", (Ground Loudspeakers and Bullhorns), section II, page 40, paragraph 1i(2); concur. Planning and coordination is required before an operation is started to insure that loud speakers are used properly, and that they can accomplish the mission. A loudspeaker mission which can not be heard by the enemy is of no value to the friendly forces.

e. (U) Reference item concerning "PSIOP/Civic Action", section II, page 40, paragraph 1i(3); concur. Combat loud speaker missions should be carried out only after careful consideration of the mission, enemy

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVHGC-DST (22 Nov 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

capabilities and friendly resources. Coordination and planning should be conducted between the S3, PSYOP officer, intelligence officer, artillery and the air representatives to insure effective use in made of the units PSYOP assets.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


L. D. MURRAY

CPT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
11th ACR
II FFV

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GPOP-DT (22 Nov 69) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment for
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 26 JAN 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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Annex A

Organizational Structure

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

- Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
- Air Cavalry Troop
- 919th Engineer Company (Armored)
- *140th Maintenance Battalion
- *506th Supply and Service Company
 - 1st Detachment, Company B, 720th Military Police Battalion
 - 5th Field Team, Company B, 6th PSYOP Battalion
 - 7th Army Postal Unit
 - 17th Public Information Detachment
 - 28th Military History Detachment
 - 33rd Chemical Detachment
 - 124th Composite Support Maintenance Detachment
 - 202nd Military Intelligence Detachment
 - 398th Transportation Detachment
 - 109th Radio Research Unit
 - 541st Military Intelligence Detachment

1st Squadron

- Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
- A Troop
- B Troop
- C Troop
- D Company
- Howitzer Battery

2nd Squadron

- Headquarters and Headquarters Troop
- E Troop
- F Troop
- G Troop
- H Company
- Howitzer Battery

3rd Squadron

- I Troop
- K Troop
- L Troop
- M Company
- Howitzer Battery

*Attached support unit

Incl 1

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Annex C

TASK ORGANIZATION

1. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was OPCON to 1st Cavalry Division during the entire quarter.

2. Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

a. During the reporting period the following major units were OPCON to the 11th ACR for the periods indicated:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
B/1-8 Cav	1-5 Aug
C/5-7 Cav	1-7 Aug
2/11 ACR	1 Aug - 7 Sep
1/11 ACR	1 Aug - 31 Oct
D/5-7 Cav	5-16 Aug
1-16 Inf (MECH) (-)	7 Aug - 20 Sep
34th Ranger (ARVN)	8 Aug - 6 Sep
E/1-1 Cav	13-16 Aug
E/1-1 Cav	13-26 Aug
1-5 Cav	16 Aug - 1 Oct
3/11 ACR	6 Sep - 31 Oct
2/11 ACR	11-31 Oct
D/1-5 Cav	25-30 Oct

b. During the reporting the following units were DC to the 11th ACR for the period indicated:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
B/1-9 Cav	8 Aug - 4 Sep
C/2-33 Arty	7 Aug - 20 Sep
E/1-21 Arty	13-16 Aug
B/1-77 Arty	17 Aug - 1 Oct

3. Task Force WRIGHT: Task Force Wright was a special task organization under the Regimental Executive Office which functioned during the Battle of Northern BINH LONG Province. The following units made up Task Force WRIGHT:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
1/11 ACR	8 Aug - 6 Sep
34th Rangers (ARVN)	8 Aug - 6 Sep
B/1-9 Cav	18 Aug - 4 Sep

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4. HQ, 1st Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

a. The following units were OPCON to the 1/11 ACR during the periods indicated:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
One-Plt/919th Engr	1 Aug - 31 Oct
B/1-8 Cav	1-5 Aug
D/1-7 Cav	5-8 Aug
D/1-7 Cav	19-26 Aug
D/1-5 Cav	6-13 Sep
M/3/11 ACR	8-20 Sep
B/1-5 Cav	13-16 Sep
A/1-5 Cav	27-29 Sep
D/1-5 Cav	27-29 Sep
B/1-5 Cav	29 Sep - 1 Oct
C/1-5 Cav	29 Sep - 1 Oct
E/1-5 Cav	29 Sep - 2 Oct

b. The following organic troop/company size units of 1/11 ACR were not under its operational control during the period indicated:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>OPCON TO</u>
C/1/11 ACR	6-8 Aug	2/11 ACR
C/1/11 ACR	18 Aug - 8 Oct	3-Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
C/1/11 ACR	16-20 Sep	1-5 Cav
C/1/11 ACR	21-22 Sep	2/11 ACR
C/1/11 ACR	27-29 Sep	1-5 Cav
B/1/11 ACR	29 Sep - 12 Oct	3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
B/1/11 ACR	12-13 Oct	2/11 ACR
C/1/11 ACR	21-22 Oct	3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)

5. HQ, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

a. During the indicated period the following troop/company size units were OPCON to the 2/11 ACR:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
M/3/11 ACR	19-25 Aug, 1-8 Sep
C/1/11 ACR	6-8 Aug
D/5-7 Cav	11-16 Aug
D/1-7 Cav	16-19 Aug
B/1/11 ACR	12-13 Oct
D/1-5 Cav	25-30 Oct
One Plt/919 Engr	1 Aug - 31 Oct

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b. The 2/11 ACR (-) was not OPCON to the 11th ACR during 8 September to 10 October. During this time 2/11 ACR (-) was OPCON to 1st Inf Div at DI AM while receiving and training with the M551 AR/AAV.

c. The following organic troop/company size units were not under operational control of 2/11 ACR during the period indicated:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>OPCON TO</u>
G/2/11 ACR	1-19 Aug	3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
	19 Aug - 17 Sep	2nd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)
	17-20 Sep	5th Div (ARVN)
H/2/11 ACR	3-10 Sep	3/11 ACR
	10-20 Sep	1-16 Inf (MECH)
	20 Sep - 2 Oct	3/11 ACR
How/2/11 ACR	8 Aug - 20 Sep	1-16 Inf (MECH)
	20 Sep - 2 Oct	3/11 ACR
F/2/11 ACR	26-30 Oct	3rd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)

6. HQ, 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment:

a. The following units were OPCON to the 3/11 ACR during the periods indicated:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
H/2/11 ACR	6-10 Sep, 20 Sep - 2 Oct
How/2/11 ACR	20 Sep - 2 Oct
L/1-8 Cav	21-22 Sep
C/1/11 ACR	21-22 Sep
One Plt 219th Engr	1 Aug - 31 Oct

b. The 3rd Squadron, 11th ACR was not OPCON to the 11th ACR during the period 23 Aug - 6 Sep. 3/11 ACR was at Blackhorse Base Camp receiving and training with the M551 AR/AAV. The 3/11 ACR was OPCON to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade during the indicated period.

c. The following organic troops/companies were not under operational control of 3/11 ACR during the period indicated:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>OPCON TO</u>
M/3/11 ACR	19-25 August	2/11 ACR
	25 Aug - 1 Sep	1-16 Inf (MECH)
	1-8 Sep	2/11 ACR
	8-20 Sep	1/11 ACR
K/3/11 ACR	6 Sep - 24 Oct	Blackhorse Base Camp Cndr
L/3/11 ACR	4-8 Oct	Div Arty, 1st Cav Div (AM)
K/3/11 ACR	24-26 Oct	HQ Cndt, 11th ACR Rear BIEN HOA
L/3/11 ACR	29-31 Oct	2nd Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM)

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Annex D

Army Aviation Statistical Summary

1. Sorties Flown:

<u>MISSION</u>	<u>OH-6A</u>	<u>OH-6AA*</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>UH-1D</u>	<u>UH-1H</u>	<u>AH-1G</u>
Command and Control	2529	167	122	441	1786	0
Troop Lift	17	0	24	0	167	0
Cargo	0	0	0	0	14	0
Casualty Evacuation	0	0	0	0	3	1
Personnel Evacuation	771	6	114	131	2298	0
Reconnaissance	256	411	4	7	308	379
Armed Helicopter	0	556	0	0	0	850

2. Number Passengers:

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>
OH-6A	1649
OH-6AA	123
UH-1C	250
UH-1D	242
UH-1H	4675

3. Tons Cargo:

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>TONS CARGO</u>
OH-6A	0
UH-1C	0
UH-1D	1
UH-1H	8

*OH-6A LOH armed with minigun

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4. Hours Flown by Aircraft:

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>HOURS FLOWN</u>
OH-6A	3436
AH-1G	1719
UH-1C	97
UH-1D	331
UH-1H	3766

5. Results of Fire:

	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
VC/NVA KPL (BC)	22	0	0	22
VC/NVA KBA (POSS)	2	0	0	2
Structures Destroyed	28	0	0	28
Structures Damaged	3	0	0	3

6. Ammunition Expended:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>ROUNDS</u>
7.62	128,814
2.75	3,075
40mm	5,090

7. Aircraft Availability (% Operational Ready):

	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>
UH-1D	77	78	0
UH-1H	90	87	90
AH-1G	88	86	89
OH-6A	75	86	86
UH-1C	81	100	0

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8. Aircraft Non-Operational Due to (Supply):¹

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>
UH-1C	0	0	0
UH-1D	1.6	5.0	0
UH-1H	3.1	0.9	0.3
AH-1G	3.0	0.5	1.7
OH-6A	7.2	2.4	3.1

9. Aircraft Non-Operational Ready (Maintenance)²

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>
UH-1C	9	0	0
UH-1D	21	17	0
UH-1H	7	12	10
AH-1G	9	13	10
OH-6A	17	12	10

¹ Percent of hours downtime due to supply.

² Percent of hours downtime due to maintenance.

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